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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3)(j) and (4) and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)Q). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment to Jim 
and Melodie Imus based upon the doctrine of boundary by estoppel? 
Issue: Can the trial court's grant of summary judgment be sustained based upon 
the doctrine of boundary by agreement? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary Judgment 
A trial court's conclusions of law in granting summary judgment are generally 
reviewed by an appellate court for correctness. However, as discussed more fully below, 
a trial court's resolution of the mixed question of law and fact presented by a claim for 
equitable estoppel is entitled to deference on appeal and will be upheld absent an abuse 
of discretion. 
Equitable Estoppel 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "while we generally consider de novo 
a trial court's statement of the legal rule, we often review with far less rigor the court's 
determination of the legal consequences of facts." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 
1994). This is because "with regard to many mixed question^ of fact and law, it is either 
not possible or not wise for an appellate court to define strictly how a legal concept is to 
be applied to each new set of facts" and in such cases "overinvolvement by an appellate 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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court can lead to confusing and inconsistent pronouncements of the law." State v. Levin, 
2006 UT 50, lj 22, 144 P.3d 1096. Accordingly, in cases involving mixed questions of 
law and fact, the appellate courts wish to leave a trial court free "to reach one of several 
possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without risking 
reversal." Id, In order to guide the appellate courts in determining the proper level of 
deference to afford a trial court's resolution of mixed questions of law and fact, in Pena 
the Utah Supreme Court developed a four-part test.1 
Applying the Pena test to equitable estoppel, the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
the "issue of whether equitable estoppel has been proven is a classic mixed question of 
fact and law," applicable "to a wide variety of factual and legal situations," which 
"weighs heavily against lightly substituting our judgment for that of the trial court." State 
Dep Y. of Hitman Services ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997). 
Accordingly, on appeal the court will "properly grant the trial court's decision a fair 
degree of deference when we review the mixed question of whether the requirements of 
the law of estoppel have been satisfied in any given factual situation." Id. Affording 
such deference, "an appellate court will not overturn the trial court's application of 
equitable estoppel absent an abuse of discretion." State Dep Y. of Human Services ex rel 
1
 As refined by the court in State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50,144 P.3d 1096 this test includes 
following elements: (1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the 
legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal 
rule relies on "facts" observed by the trial judge, "such as a witness's appearance and 
demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the 
record available to appellate courts;" and (3) other policy reasons that weigh for or against 
granting discretion to trial courts. 
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Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997); Dahllnv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 
391, 101P.3d830. 
Whether the facts to which the trial court applies the law are contested and 
resolved following trial or are uncontested and submitted through written pleadings on 
summary judgment does not change this standard. While the Reviewing court will (just 
like the trial court) view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the 
court will nevertheless afford deference to the trial court's application of the law to those 
facts, and will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court absent an ''abuse of 
discretion." This is evident from numerous Utah court decisions where, notwithstanding 
the fact that the operative facts were not obtained through trial, deference was 
nevertheless afforded to the trial court's resolution of mixed questions of law and fact. 
For example, in Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, 12 P.3d 580, 
the trial court dismissed the defendant's unjust enrichment counterclaim based upon facts 
stipulated to by the parties. Id. at 582. On appeal, the defendant argued that the court 
should wCreview the district court's dismissal of his unjust enrichment counterclaim for 
correctness, granting no discretion to the district court's application of the law to the facts 
in this case because the parties stipulated to the facts." Id. The defendant umaintain[ed] 
that because the parties stipulated to the facts, the trial court did not 'observe' any facts 
that are not presented in identical form on appeal" and that as a result, the wCthird [Pena\ 
factor weighing in favor of granting discretion to the district court is absent, and 
therefore, [the court] should grant no discretion to the district pourt in this case." Id. 
The court flatly rejected this argument, explaining that the court's conclusion in 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998) that the Pena factors militated in favor of 
broad deference to the trial court's application of the facts to the law of unjust enrichment 
was unaffected by the fact that the operative facts were stipulated instead of determined 
after trial: 
Although the district court did not have the opportunity to "observe" the 
stipulated facts, it did have adequate opportunity to become fully 
acquainted with the facts. Additionally, the other reasons we described in 
Jeffs for granting the trial court broad discretion are still applicable in this 
case and weigh in favor of granting discretion to the district court. As we 
stated in Jeffs, the facts underlying unjust enrichment claims vary greatly 
from case to case, and the doctrine of unjust enrichment was specifically 
developed to address situations "that did not fit within a particular legal 
standard but which nonetheless merited judicial intervention." Id. at 1244-
45. In Jeffs, we also said that an appellate court's ability to clearly articulate 
outcome-determinative factors in unjust enrichment cases "'remains 
elusive," and thus favored granting the trial court broad discretion. Id. at 
1245. Furthermore, we determined that there were no policy reasons 
outweighing the factors favoring broad discretion. As in Jeffs, we will 
review the district court's legal findings for correctness, granting it broad 
discretion in its application of unjust enrichment law to the stipulated facts. 
Id. Utah courts have consistently applied the same reasoning in other cases involving 
review of a trial court's resolution of mixed questions of law and fact, including appeals 
from a grant of summary judgment.2 
2
 See John Holmes Const., Inc. v. R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc., 2004 UT App. 392, 101 
P.3d 833 (reviewing grant of summary judgment and affording "broad discretion to the 
trial court in its application of unjust enrichment law to the facts") rev'd on other grounds 
by John Holmes Const., Inc. v. R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc., 2005 UT 83, 131 P.3d 199; 
see also Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, 40 P.3d 
599 (noting that although "[wjhether a party has waived the right to arbitrate is a factually 
intensive determination" because it presents a mixed question of law and fact, trial court's 
determination of whether right has been waived is entitled to deference on appeal, even 
where no live testimony taken); Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. v. BriteSmile Management, Inc., 
122 P.3d 654 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (same). 
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Accordingly, just as in Desert Miriah and numerous other Utah cases, the appellate 
court must afford deference to the trial court's determination $iat equitable estoppel is 
proper in this case. Although the trial court did not hear live testimony, the court not only 
considered the stipulated and undisputed facts in the light most favorable to the Bahrs, it 
also resolved all disputed facts in their favor. Following oral argument, it determined that 
the mixed question of law and fact presented by the Imuses' equitable estoppel claim 
militated in favor of invoking equitable estoppel. 
While this inquiry was necessarily fact-intensive, it is this very characteristic of 
adjudication of claims that present mixed questions of law and fact that the Utah Supreme 
Court has held justifies deference to the trial court. See Levin, 144 P.3d at 1103 
("Discretion is broadest-and the standard of review is most dtferential-when the 
application of a legal concept is highly fact dependant and variable.")/ Accordingly, the 
trial court's conclusion that equitable estoppel is proper in thii case should not be 
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking removal of one of the Defendants' trees as a 
"nuisance" and claiming that the fence marking the boundary between the Bahrs' property 
3
 See also Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson,&$6 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding that discretion must be granted to trial court's application of the law of equitable 
estoppel to the facts because "the determination of equitable elstoppel is ca highly fact-
dependent question, one that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case because 
we cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a course of such 
decisions.'") citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 938; see also Irizarry, ^45 P.2d at 678; Desert 
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and the Imuses' property was improperly located. By their Complaint, the Bahrs asserted 
claims for trespass, quiet title, private nuisance, slander, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Defendants filed a counterclaim, asserting that the fence at issue in 
this litigation has been in place since July of 1983, was built as a boundary fence with the 
agreement and help of the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, and has been treated as such by 
the Imuses, the Bahrs, and the Bahrs' predecessors in interest for well over twenty years 
prior to the initiation of this litigation. Accordingly, even if there were some discrepancy 
between the location of the fence and the legal description contained in the parties' 
warranty deeds, title to the disputed parcel of property is properly vested in the Imuses 
under the doctrines of boundary by acquiescence, boundary by agreement and boundary 
by estoppel. 
Proceedings Below 
This action was initiated by the Bahrs on or about April 2, 2004. By their 
complaint, the Bahrs' asserted claims for private nuisance, slander, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, trespass, and quiet title. (R. 1-12.) Extensive discovery was 
undertaken by the Plaintiffs, including the depositions of nearly a dozen of the parties' 
neighbors in an attempt to produce evidence in support of their Bahrs' claim for slander 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Imuses filed for summary judgment 
on these and the Bahrs' other claims on or about January 19, 2007. (R. 215-216.) 
By their motion, the Imuses demonstrated that notwithstanding their extensive 
discovery, the Bahrs had not produced any evidence whatsoever in support of their claims 
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for slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Bahrs finally stipulated 
to dismissal of these claims. Memorandum Decision, dated September 12, 2007 
("Mem.Dec") at 3. (R. 1188.) The Imuses further demonstraljed that they were entitled to 
summary judgment based on the doctrines of Boundary by Estoppel and Boundary by 
Agreement. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Moljion for Summary Judgment 
(R. 457-486.) 
After considering the undisputed facts, and construing all disputed facts in the light 
most favorable to the Bahrs, the trial court ruled that the Imuses were entitled to 
possession of the disputed parcel based upon the doctrine of boundary by estoppel. Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defying Plaintiffs['] Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Motion to Compel, dated October 16, 2007 ("Order") at 2. 
(R. 1194.) Because this ruling disposed of the Bahrs" claims, the court did not rule on the 
Imuses" claim for Boundary by Agreement. Mem.Dec. at 4. (jl. 1189.) The Bahrs have 
now appealed this ruling. 
Imus' Statement of Undisputed Facts 
1. On or about March 24, 1983, Jim and Melodee Imus (the "Imuses") 
purchased the property located at 2084 E. Buckingham Way, $andy, Utah, (the "Imus 
Property"). See Imus Warranty Deed, Exhibit A to Jim Imus Affidavit. (R. 235.) 
2. In about June of 1983, the Imuses approached their then-next-door-
neighbors to the east, (the "Daltons") and their then-neighbor^ to the west, Brent and 
Brenda Wyman (the "Wymans"), living at 2074 E. Buckingham Way, Sandy, Utah, to 
discuss the construction of a fence marking a boundary between their respective 
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properties (the "Boundary Fence"). Deposition of Melodee Imus ("Melodee Imus Dep.") 
at 36:24 - 37:4, 52:19 - 53:8 (R. 271-274); Deposition of Jim Imus ("Jim Imus Dep.") at 
30:18 - 31:13. (R. 287-288.) 
3. The Wymans indicated that although they could not afford to help pay for 
the construction of the Boundary Fence, they would like to have the fence and were 
willing to assist in locating and constructing the Boundary Fence. Melodee Imus Dep. at 
36:24 - 37:20, 54:20-22 (R. 271-273; 275); Jim Imus Dep. at 33:11-20 (R. 289); Affidavit 
of Brenda Wyman ("Brenda Wyman Aff.") at ^ 3 (R. 218); Affidavit of Brent Wyman 
("Brent Wyman Aff") at 13 (R. 223. ).4 
4. The Imuses and the Wymans thereafter agreed to the location of the 
4
 The Bahrs contend that the affidavit testimony of Brent Wyman should be disregarded 
because an executed copy of the affidavit was inadvertently not filed by the Imuses. 
However, "it is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial court may not be raised 
for the first time on appeal." Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 
P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). If a party opposing summary judgment fails to move to 
strike a defective affidavit, "formal or evidentiary defects in [the] affidavit... are 
waived." Pinetree Assocs. v. Ephraim City, 2003 UT 6, f 19, 67 P.3d 462, 465; see also 
Franklin Financial, 659 P.2d at 1044 ("[I]f. . . an opposing party fails to move to strike 
the defective affidavits, he is deemed to have waived his opposition to whatever 
evidentiary defects may exist."); Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352, 353-54 
(Utah 1972) ("[FJormal defects are waived in the absence of such a motion or other 
objection."). As noted, even formal defects in an affidavit are admitted if the opposing 
party does not timely object, as shown by Hobelman Motors, Inc., v. Allred, where an 
opposing party waived its right to strike an affidavit that was not notarized. 685 P.2d 
544, 546 (Utah 1984). 
Not only did the Bahrs fail to object to Brent Wyman's affidavit or raise any alleged 
defect in their memorandum opposing the Imuses' motion for summary judgment, the 
Bahrs failed to do so during the many months between the time the Imuses filed their 
summary judgment memorandum and oral argument or during oral argument. 
Accordingly, the factual contentions regarding Brent Wyman's testimony contained in the 
Imuses' memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment must be deemed 
admitted by the Bahrs. 
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Boundary Fence and worked together to construct the fence. Melodee Imus Dep. at 
55:11-19, 57:10 - 58:13, 60:842 (R. 276-279); Jim Imus De#. at 34:13 - 36:10, 37:10-18 
(R. 290-292); Brenda Wyman Aff. at If 4 (R. 218); Brent Wyriian Aff. at If 4. (R. 223.)5 
5. Because it was not clear where the actual boundary line was located, at the 
time the Boundary Fence was built, the Wymans and the Imuses agreed that the fence 
marked the boundary between their respective properties. Mqlodee Imus Dep. at 55:11-
19, 57:10 - 58:13, 60:8-12 (R. 276-279); Jim Imus Dep. at 34:13 - 36:10, 37:10-18 (R. 
290-292); Brenda Wyman Aff. at <f 5 (R. 218); Brent Wyman Aff. at«| 5. (R. 223.)6 
6. Following the construction of the Boundary Fence, the Imuses and the 
Wymans at all times treated the fence as the boundary betweeii their respective properties. 
See Affidavit of Melodee Imus ("Melodee Imus Aff.") at f 7 |R. 229); Affidavit of Jim 
Imus ("Jim Imus Aff") at f 7 (R. 250); Brenda Wyman Aff. at t 6 (R. 218); Brent 
Wyman Aff. at f^ 6 (R. 223.) Photographs of the Boundary Fence shortly after 
construction are attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavits of Mefodee and Jim Imus. (R. 
5
 The Bahrs did not dispute Fact Nos. 1-4 in opposing the Imifises' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and they must accordingly be deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6
 The Bahrs attempted to dispute this fact on summary judgment by citing to testimony 
indicating that in deciding where to build the Boundary Fence the Imuses and Wymans 
referred to markings on the ground and used tape measures. However, both the Imuses 
and the Wymans have unequivocally testified that although th^y used existing stakes and 
marking pins to estimate the location of the boundary line between their respective 
properties, they were nevertheless uncertain of the precise location of the true boundary 
line. Melodee Imus Dep. at 55:11-19, 57:10 - 58:13, 60:8-12 (R. 276-279); Jim Imus 
Dep. at 34:13 - 36:10, 37:10-18 (R. 290-292); Brenda Wyman Aff. at f 5 (R. 218); Brent 
Wyman Aff. at If 5. (R. 223.) Accordingly, the trial court correctly held that there is no 
genuine dispute regarding this fact. 
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237-240; 257-260.)7 
7. Within weeks of the construction of the Boundary Fence, the Imuses 
constructed improvements on their property up to the Boundary Fence. These 
improvements included landscaping, irrigation, and storage sheds. Melodee Imus Aff. at 
f 8 (R. 229); Jim Imus Aff. at f 8 (R.250); Brenda Wyman Aff. at f 7 (R.218); Brent 
WymanAff. at^|7. (R. 223.)8 
8. The landscaping installed by the Imuses is elaborate and costly. The Imuses 
have a great love of nature, and selected their lot specifically because of the view and the 
exposure to sunlight needed for planting. Melodee Imus Aff. at | 9 (R.229-230); Jim 
Imus Aff. at *| 9 (R. 250-251.) Over time the Imuses have planted thousands of plants 
including annuals, perennials, trees and shrubs, and even installed a high-quality built-in 
koi pond, all in an effort to attract birds and create a natural secluded environment. Id. 
The total estimated costs for these improvements is in excess of $30,000.00. Id. 
Photographs of the Imuses' landscaping as it has matured over they years are attached as 
Exhibit C to the Affidavits of Jim and Melodee Imus. (R.261-265; 242-246.)9 
7
 The Bahrs did not dispute this fact in opposing the Imuses' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and it must accordingly be deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
8
 Although the Bahrs attempted to contest this fact on summary judgment, the deposition 
pages they cited simply indicate that there has been and is currently vegetation, bird 
feeders, groundcover, etc. on the Disputed Parcel. In fact, Plaintiffs Robert Bahr and 
Sherri Bahr specifically testified that they "don't know" whether the Imuses had installed 
irrigation prior to the time the Bahrs purchased their property, but they saw the "water 
[come] on." Robert Bahr Dep. at 59:22 - 60:4 (R.739); Sherri Bahr Dep. at 115:12-18. 
(R.345.) Given the testimony of the Imuses, the trial court correctly held that there is no 
genuine dispute regarding this fact. 
9
 Melodie Imus testified that while the original cost of the improvements to the Disputed 
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9. In or about 1985, the Wymans sold the 2074 E. Buckingham Way property 
to Joe Carlisle. See Warranty Deed attached to the affidavit of Jim Imus as Exhibit H. 
(R.343.) 
10. At all times during Mr. Carlisle's ownership of the 2074 E. Buckingham 
Way property, the Imuses and Mr. Carlisle treated the Boundary Fence as the boundary 
between their respective properties. Melodee Imus Aff. at \ 11 (R.230); Jim Imus Aff. at 
If 11. (R. 251.) 
11. In or about December of 1988, the Bahrs purchased the 2074 E. 
Buckingham Way property (the wCBahr Property). The Bahrs' Complaint, at f 6. (R. 2.) 
12. At all times following the Bahrs' purchase of th0 2074 E. Buckingham Way 
property, the Imuses and the Bahrs each occupied, maintained^ and improved their 
respective properties up to, but not over, the Boundary Fence. Melodee Imus Aff. at \ 13 
(R.230); Jim Imus Aff. at \ 13. (R. 251.)10 
13. The Bahrs admit that prior to the initiation of this action in March of 2004, 
they never took any action to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or occupying the 
property east of the Boundary Fence. Deposition of Sherri Bahr (uSherri Bahr Dep.") at 
65:7-12 (R. 350); Deposition of Robert Bahr ("Robert Bahr D^p."), at 26:10-21. (R. 
Parcel was approximately $7000-$9000, the estimated replacement cost of the now 
mature landscaping is in excess of $15,000. Second Melodee Imus Aff. at f 4 (R.1033.). 
Accordingly, the trial court properly held that there is no genuine dispute that the Imuses 
expended at least $7000 - $9000 improving the Disputed Parcel. 
10 On summary judgment, the Bahrs did not dispute Fact Nos. 
deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
9-12, and they are therefore 
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360.)11 
14. Prior to September of 2003. the relationship between the Imuses and the 
Bahrs was cordial and friendly, and the parties performed neighborly tasks for each other 
like collecting each other's mail while on vacation. Sherri Bahr Dep. at 125:2-22 (R. 
775); Melodee Imus Aff. at f 15 (R. 309); Jim Imus Aff at 115. (R.328.) 
15. In about September of 2003, the Bahrs complained to the Imuses that they 
did not like the Russian Olive tree the Imuses had growing in their back yard next to the 
Boundary Fence, and requested that the Imuses trim or remove the tree. Jim Imus Dep. at 
59:19-23 (R. 717); Melodee Imus Dep. at 68:1-9. (R. 686.) 
16. The Imuses gave the Bahrs permission to remove the Russian Olive tree, 
and even obtained estimates for the removal of the tree, but the Bahrs declined to remove 
the tree themselves or pay a third party to perform that work. Jim Imus Dep. at 62:14— 
63:3 (R.718); Melodee Imus Dep. at 76:17-77:2, 78:10-79:1. (R. 688-689.) 
17. As a result of the parties' inability to resolve their dispute over the Russian 
Olive tree, their relationship began to deteriorate. Beginning in October of 2003, the 
The Bahrs attempted to dispute this fact on summary judgment by asserting that they 
complained that the "fence looked off," made complaints to Sandy City in approximately 
2003, and thereafter obtained a survey. Sherri Bahr Dep. 18:3-19:23, 21:10-22:3, 26:19-
27:5, 31:24-32:21, 34:20-35:11, 41:8-13, 44:7-45:22, 46:7-49:15, 50:14-51:17, 55:19-
57:17, 57:20-59:21, 61:5-10, 129:243-130:4 (R. 749-759, 776-777); Robert Bahr Dep. 
16:23-17:9, 20:6-21:5, 22:5-23:3, 34:20-35:16, 66:9-20, 70:2-71:2 (R. 728-730, 733, 741-
742); lone SennDep. 13:7-15:6, 18:19-19:1. (R. 782-784.) However, notwithstanding 
these allegations, the Plaintiffs expressly admitted during their depositions that for nearly 
15 years after acquiring their property, they never took any action to prevent the Imuses 
from using, improving, and occupying the Disputed Parcel. Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65:7-12 
(R. 350); Robert Bahr Dep. at 26:10-21. (R.360.) Accordingly, there can be no genuine 
dispute regarding Fact No. 13. 
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Bahrs began contacting Sandy City to lodge complaints again$t the Imuses, including 
complaints regarding the proximity of the Imuses' storage shejds to the property line, the 
Imuses' front yard landscaping, and the Imuses' parking of th^ir travel trailer in their 
driveway. Sherri Bahr Dep. at 57:3-7, 57:20-60:20. (R. 758-759.) 
18. The Bahrs now contend that they obtained a suryey of the Bahr Property in 
November of 2003 (the "Bahr Survey") which indicates that the disputed Russian Olive 
Tree is actually on their property, as the Boundary Fence is improperly located and 
deviates from the true property line from a couple of inches at the street in the front of 
their home to approximately live feet at the back of the parties' properties, creating a pie-
shaped parcel that is now in dispute (the "Disputed Parcel"). JThe Bahrs' Complaint at *|[ 
29. (R. 4-5.) 
19. The Bahrs admit that when they purchased the Bahr Property, the Boundary 
Fence and the disputed Russian Olive tree were already in plape, and that they did not 
suspect or believe that they were purchasing the Disputed Parcel. Indeed, Mr. Bahr 
specifically admitted that at the time he purchased his property he did not "suspect[] or 
believe[] that [he] was also purchasing the [Disputed Parcel], that he "did not rely on the 
deed description" or believe the deed description "was at variance" with the location of 
the fence. Robert Bahr Dep. at 32: 23 -33:8; 74:12-22. (R.732, 743.) 
i 
20. The Bahrs further admitted that "if it turns out [the Bahrs] are now able to 
attain" the Disputed Parcel they would be "getting more than [they] thought [they] were 
getting at the time [they] purchased" their property. Robert Bahr Dep, at 33:9-13. (R. 
732.) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21. Although Sherri Bahr now contends that she "questioned" over the years 
whether the Boundary Fence marked the true boundary between the parties' respective 
properties, prior to the dispute over the Russian Olive Tree in approximately September 
of 2003, the Bahrs took no action to determine whether the Boundary Fence actually 
marked the property line. The Bahrs' Complaint at f^ 28 (R.4); Sherri Bahr Dep. at 45:16— 
46:1. (R. 755-756.) 
22. The distance between the Imuses' east boundary fence and the west 
Boundary Fence is 80 feet—the same distance indicated on the Imuses' plat map for their 
property. See Jim Imus Aff. at «f 20 (R.252); Imus Property Plat Map. (R. 368.) If the 
Boundary Fence were moved as the Bahrs request, the Imuses would lose approximately 
five feet of their property which they likely could not recover from their east neighbor due 
to the long passage of time. 
23. Moving the boundary at this point would not only require the Imuses to 
incur significant expense, but would also cause them significant inconvenience, as 
irrigation systems would have to be relocated, their storage shed would have to be 
removed altogether, and they would lose virtually all of the irreplaceable mature 
landscaping on the west side of their property. Melodee Imus Aff. at |^ 21-22 (R.231); Jim 
Imus Aff. at ^ 21-22. (R. 252.) Further, Plaintiffs have expressly testified that unless the 
Imuses can somehow manage to move the twenty year-old trees and hundreds of other 
large and mature plants in the Disputed Parcel to some other location, they intend to 
destroy most of this landscaping, and that the ability to do so is one of the motives of this 
lawsuit. Robert Bahr Dep. at 29:25 - 31:16 (R.731-732); lone Senn Dep. at 46:13-47:11. 
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(R.791.) 
24. Removal of the landscaping in the Disputed Parfcel would eliminate the 
Imuses' privacy and shade, and destroy the fruits of the Imusds many years of hard work 
and long hours devoted to beautifying and improving their landscape. Melodee Imus Aff. 
at 1j 22 (R.231); Jim Imus Aff. at 122. (R. 252.) Such loss would be virtually impossible 
to mitigate at any reasonable cost, as the mature growth on th^ west side of the Imuses' 
property has taken over 20 years to cultivate, grow, and develop. Id. Photographs of the 
Imuses' landscaping as it has matured over the years are attached as Exhibit C to the 
Affidavits of Jim and Melodee Imus. (R.237-240; 257-260.) 
25. The Wymans, the original owners of the Bahrs' property, have testified that 
they believe that based upon their agreement with the Imuses regarding the Boundary 
Fence, it would be inequitable to now quiet title to the Disputed Parcel in the Bahrs or 
require removal of the Boundary Fence. Brenda Wyman Aff. at j^ 8 (R. 242); Brent 
WymanAff .atp. (R.223.) 
Response to Bahrs' Statement of the Case and Facts 
As a general matter, throughout the Bahrs' factual statement, many of their 
citations do not support their conclusions. Furthermore, the Bahrs include argument in 
their factual statement. Finally, the Bahrs mischaracterize the evidence by adding 
unsupported interpretations to several of their factual statemeitts and improperly 
construing the facts. Regarding certain specific factual statements made by the Bahrs in 
their appeal brief, the Imuses respond as follows: 
Alleged Fact No. 5: The deposition testimony cited hi support of this alleged fact 
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does not support the alleged fact. While Jim Imus testified that Brent Wyman did aid in 
measuring and constructing the fence, neither Jim Imus nor Melodee Imus testified that 
Brenda Wyman did not participate. Melodee Imus Dep. 33:2-20 (R. 711); 53:9-55:17 (R. 
683.) To the contrary, Brenda Wyman testified that "the Imuses and the Wymans . . . 
worked together to construct the fence." Brenda Wyman Aff. at f 4. (R. 297.) 
Further, Both the Imuses and the Wymans have unequivocally testified that 
although they used existing stakes and marking pins to estimate the location of the 
boundary line between their respective properties, they were nevertheless uncertain of the 
precise location of the true boundary line, and that they accordingly agreed that the 
Boundary Fence would mark the boundary line. Melodee Imus Dep. at 55:11-19, 57:10-
58:13, 60:8-12 (R. 683-684); Jim Imus Dep. at 34:13- 36:10, 37:10-18 (R. 711-712); 
Brenda Wyman Aff. at ^ 5 (R. 864); Brent Wyman Aff. at t 5. (R. 869 ) 
Alleged Fact No. 6: Both the Imuses and the Wymans have unequivocally 
testified that although they used existing stakes and marking pins to measure and estimate 
the location of the boundary line between their respective properties, they were 
nevertheless uncertain of the precise location of the true boundary line, and that they 
accordingly agreed that the Boundary Fence would mark the boundary line. See 
Response to Alleged Fact No. 5, supra. This uncertainty regarding the precise location of 
the boundary line is reinforced by the fact that the Imuses and Wymans did not obtain a 
survey or hire a professional to locate the true boundary line, a fact which the Bahrs 
themselves expressly admit. 
Alleged Fact No. 7: The deposition testimony cited in support of this alleged fact 
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does not support the alleged fact. Rather, the Imuses and the Wymans have 
unequivocally testified that although they used existing stakes) and marking pins to 
measure and estimate the location of the boundary line between their respective 
properties, they were nevertheless uncertain of the precise location of the true boundary 
line, and that they accordingly agreed that the Boundary Fence would mark the boundary 
line. See Response to Alleged Fact No. 5, supra. Indeed, Jim Imus noted that although 
the parties ultimately reached an agreement as to the location of the fence, Brent Wyman 
thought that he actually wCgot a little more than [he was] supposed to have." Jim Imus Dep. 
36:5-10. (R. 711.) Given this, there can be no genuine dispute on this issue. 
Alleged Fact No. 8: Both the Imuses and the Wymans have unequivocally 
testified that although they used existing stakes and marking p^ ins to measure and estimate 
the location of the boundary line between their respective properties, they were 
nevertheless uncertain of the precise location of the true boundary line, and that they 
accordingly agreed that the Boundary Fence would mark the boundary line. See 
Response to Alleged Fact No. 5, supra. This uncertainty regarding the precise location 
of the boundary line is reinforced by the fact that the Imuses and Wymans did not obtain 
a survey or hire a professional to locate the true boundary line, a fact which the Bahrs 
themselves expressly admit. Accordingly, there can be no genuine dispute that the parties 
were uncertain as to the precise location of the true boundary fine and resolved the 
uncertainty by agreeing to treat the Boundary Fence as the true boundary. 
Alleged Fact No. 12: Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs never 
mentioned any complaints or concerns regarding the location of the Boundary Fence. 
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Melodee Imus Dep. at 64:9-17 (R. 685); Jim Imus Dep. at 46:5-15. (R. 714.) However, 
even if Alleged Fact No. 12 is accepted as true, it is not material to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and accordingly is admitted for the limited purposes of 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment only. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the Bahrs' allegations regarding their alleged 
statements about the location of the Boundary Fence, the Plaintiffs expressly admitted 
during their depositions that they never took any action to prevent the Imuses from using, 
improving, and occupying the Disputed Parcel. Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65:7-12 (R. 760); 
Robert Bahr Dep. at 26:10-21. (R. 731.) Accordingly, there can be no genuine dispute 
regarding Fact No. 8. 
Alleged Fact No. 13: Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs never 
mentioned any complaints or concerns regarding the location of the Boundary Fence. 
Melodee Imus Dep. at 64:9-17 (R. 685); Jim Imus Dep. at 46:5-15. (R. 714.) However, 
even if Alleged Fact No. 13 is accepted as true, it is not material to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and accordingly is admitted for the limited purposes of 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment only. 
Alleged Fact No. 19: The Imuses do not dispute this alleged fact, and have further 
testified that if the Boundary Fence had been originally located further to the cast, they 
would have installed their landscaping further to the east, and it would now be mature 
and provide shading and privacy. Jim Imus Aff. at ]f 20. (R. 252.) 
Alleged Fact No. 20: The Imuses have unequivocally testified that they have 
made significant permanent improvements to the Disputed Parcel including the Boundary 
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Fence, irrigation systems extensive landscaping, and placement of sheds. Meiodee Imus 
Aff. at U 8 (R. 229); Jim Imus Aff. at If 8 (R. 250); Brenda W^man Aff. at ^ 7 (R. 864); 
Brent Wyman Aff. at f^ 7. (R. 869.) Photographs of the Imuses' landscaping as it has 
matured over they years are attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavits of Jim and Meiodee 
Imus. Exhibit C to the Affidavits of Jim and Meiodee Imus. (1^.261-265; 242-246.) The 
Imuses have also testified that the estimated original cost of the landscaping in the 
Disputed Parcel is between $7000 and $9000, and that the replacement cost for those 
improvements, with the mature growth, is in excess of $15,000. Meiodee Imus Aff. at ^ 9 
(R. 229-230(; Jim Imus Aff. at U 9 (R. 250-251); Second Melodie Imus Aff. at | 4. (R. 
890.) The Imuses have also produced numerous receipts regarding improvements made 
to the Disputed Parcel, including receipts for materials to build the Boundary Fence and 
landscaping. See documents attached as Exhibit bCH" to Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 991-1019); Melodie 
Imus Dep. at 115:10 (R. 698); Jim Imus Dep. at 71:22-23 (R.720); Second Melodie Imus 
Aff. at U 4. (R. 890.) 
Alleged Fact No. 21: This Alleged Fact contains or calls for a legal conclusion 
that is not appropriately either admitted or denied. Moreover, the Bahrs were on actual 
and constructive notice that the Imuses had a claim to the Disputed Parcel, as the 
Boundary Fence and the Imus' landscaping was in place at the time Plaintiffs obtained 
their property, and the Plaintiffs were well aware of it. Meiodee Imus Dep. at 35:15-23 
(R. 678); Jim Imus Dep. at 32:10-16 (R. 710); Sherri Bahr De^. at 115:22-23. (R. 773.) 
Accordingly, there can be no genuine dispute regarding Alleged Fact No. 21. 
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Alleged Fact No. 22: It is undisputed that at all times following the Bahrs' 
purchase of the 2074 E. Buckingham Way property, the Imuses and the Bahrs each 
occupied, maintained, and improved their respective properties up to, but not over, the 
Boundary Fence. Melodee Imus Aff. at If 13 (R.230); Jim Imus Aff. at <j 13. (R. 251.) 
The Bahrs also admit that prior to the initiation of this action in March of 2004, they 
never took any action to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or occupying the 
property east of the Boundary Fence, despite the fact that they were aware that the Imuses 
had installed landscaping and irrigation systems in the Disputed Parcel, and continued to 
install additional landscaping after the Bahrs moved in. Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65:7-12, 
87:2-11; 114:12-115:11 (R.760, 766, 773); Robert Bahr Dep. at 26:10-21; 50:24-51:12. 
(R. 731,737.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly granted the Imuses' motion for summary judgment based 
upon the doctrine of boundary by equitable estoppel. The Imuses have met each of the 
elements of boundary by equitable estoppel, which are: 1) action or a failure to act that is 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; 2) reasonable action taken on the basis of the 
action or failure to act; and 3) a showing that injury would result from allowing 
repudiation of such action or failure to act. Dahl Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, ^  
14, 101 P.3d 83. 
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, the 
Wymans, represented to the Imuses that if they would construct the Boundary Fence, the 
Wymans would treat it as the true boundary line. It is undisputed that based upon these 
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representations, the Imuses built the Boundary Fence, installed irrigation and landscaping, 
and located their east boundary fence. It is further undisputed that the Bahrs at all times 
treated the Boundary Fence as the true boundary between theiparties after they obtained 
the property from the Wymans' successor in interest in approximately 1983, and for 
nearly 15 years thereafter neither took any action to prevent the Imuses from continuing 
to occupy and improve the Disputed Parcel, or to even determine whether the Boundary 
Fence marked the true boundary. 
Finally, it is undisputed that if the Boundary Fence were now moved, the Imuses 
would lose virtually all of the mature landscaping on the west side of their property, an 
injury which cannot be mitigated at any reasonable cost. The Imuses would also be 
compelled to move irrigation lines and tear down sheds built on the west side of their 
property. It is also undisputed that the Imuses would also lose a portion of their property 
on their east boundary, as they likely cannot recover that property due to the long passage 
of time. 
Given this, the trial court properly held that the Imuseslhad satisfied the elements 
of equitable estoppel. Because the trial court's ruling on the iksue of equitable estoppel 
involves application of the law to the undisputed facts, it is entitled to deference on 
appeal, and should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. However, even if the 
trial court's ruling were not entitled to deference, the undisputed evidence 
overwhelmingly demonstrates that the Imuses are entitled to summary judgment based 
upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
Accordingly, the Bahrs' arguments in support of their appeal must be rejected. As 
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the Utah Supreme Court made clear in Dahl Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, ^ 14, 
101 P.3d 83 and Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997), equitable estoppel does not 
require "fraud or misrepresentation" on the part of the party to be estopped. Neither did 
the Bahrs nor their predecessors in interest need to have "actual knowledge" of the true 
boundary line in order to justify estoppel. Rather, their representations and their actions 
in light of their knowledge that they were not sure of the true boundary line are sufficient 
to justify the application of estoppel. Likewise, the affirmative representations, actions, 
and inaction of the Wymans and the Bahrs are sufficient to support a claim for estoppel, 
and the Imuses reliance on this behavior was substantial and patently reasonable. Given 
all of this, the trial court's ruling and reliance on Dahl was entirely appropriate. 
The trial court's ruling can further be affirmed based on the doctrine of boundary 
by agreement, which provides that when the location of the true boundary line between 
two adjoining tracts of land is unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof may, 
by parol agreement, establish the boundary line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves 
and their grantees." Hummel v. Young, 265 P.2d 410, 411 (Utah 1953). The undisputed 
facts demonstrate that the Imuses and the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, the Wymans, 
established just such a "boundary by agreement," which is binding upon the Bahrs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE BAHRS SHOULD BE 
ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT THE BOUNDARY FENCE DOES 
NOT MARK THE TRUE BOUNDARY 
A. The Imuses Have Met All of the Elements of Boundary by Estoppel 
While the doctrines most commonly employed to resolve boundary disputes in 
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Utah are the doctrines of Boundary by Acquiescence and Boundary by Agreement, the 
Utah Supreme Court has expressly recognized a third doctrine developed to resolve 
boundary disputes: Boundary by Estoppel. As articulated by Ithe Utah Supreme Court, 
this theory "requires the combination of acts or representations by the original landowner 
and reliance by a neighbor on those representations in order to establish a boundary." 
Staker, 785 P.2d 417 at 423 n. 4. Alternatively stated, the ele|ments of an equitable 
estoppel claim establishing a boundary are 1) action or a failure to act that is inconsistent 
with a claim later asserted; 2) reasonable action taken on the t>asis of the action or failure 
to act; and 3) a showing that injury would result from allowing repudiation of such action 
or failure to act. DahlInv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UTApp 391,'f 14, 101 P.3d83. 
Applying this legal standard to the undisputed facts, the trial court held as follows: 
The Court finds that the [Imuses] have satisfied the elements of boundary 
by estoppel and so are entitled to ownership of the disputed property. In 
the present case, the undisputed evidence shows that the original 
landowners, the Wymans and the Imuses, represented jo one another that 
the boundary they established was the property line between their 
respective lots. In reliance on those mutual representations, the Imuses 
built the fence as property line marker and then installed improvements on 
the property such as a shed, koi pond, and landscaping jup to the fence line. 
The Wymans never objected to the Imuses or raised ahy complaint. After 
the [Bahrs] acquired the property formerly owned by the Wymans, at least 
for a time, they did nothing to prevent the [Imuses] from maintaining and 
adding further improvements, such as vegetation and fixtures to the 
property at issue. 
Memorandum Decision, R. 1189-1190. Based on this, the tria|l court further held: 
thb [V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
[Bahrs] may have been legally entitled to have the plat 
established as the legal boundary but that their actions 
their predecessors) estop them from asserting their legal! 
Specifically, the Court finds that the [Imuses] reasonably 
[Bahrs], the 
ljnap boundary 
(^ tnd the actions of 
rights. 
relied on the 
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boundary established by the original owners, the Wymans, and not disputed 
for many years by the [Bahrs]. Additionally, the Court finds that the 
[Imuses] would be injured if [the Bahrs] were allowed to take possession of 
the disputed portion of the property. It would be inequitable to now allow 
[the Bahrs] to assert that the fence line is not the true boundary between the 
properties and the [the Bahrs] are now estopped from doing so. 
Id. at 1190-1191. 
The trial court's application of the undisputed facts to the law of equitable estoppel 
is entitled to deference on appeal. Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 678, 680; Dahl, 2004 UT App 
391, Till 8, 14. See Standard of Review, supra, at 1-5. Accordingly, in to overturn the 
decision of the trial court, the Bahrs bear the burden of establishing that the trial court 
"abused its discretion" in determining that equitable estoppel was proper in this case. Id. 
The Bahrs cannot carry this burden. 
The Wymans testified that they represented to the Imuses that if they would build 
the Boundary Fence, they would treat it as the boundary between the parties' respective 
properties. Brenda Wyman Aff. at 1 5 (R. 968); Brent Wyman Aff. at ^ 5. (R. 971.) 
Based upon these representations, the Imuses incurred significant expense in constructing 
the Boundary Fence. Further, at all times following the construction of the Boundary 
Fence, the Imuses and the Wymans both recognized the fence as a boundary, and 
occupied, improved, and enjoyed their respective properties up to, but not over, the 
Boundary Fence.12 Over the ensuing years the Imuses installed landscaping, an irrigation 
system, and other improvements, including storage sheds near the fence.13 The Imuses 
have spent literally hundreds of hours over the years planting thousands of plants 
12
 Statement of Facts, supra, at *[  6. 
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including annuals, perennials, trees, and shrubs, and even installed an in-ground koi pond, 
all in an effort to create a natural, secluded backyard environment.14 These efforts have 
come not only with a personal cost, but a financial cost in excess of $30,000.00. Id. 
In addition, based upon the representations of the Wyitians, the Imuses located 
their east boundary fence approximately 5 feet further to the Afvest than they otherwise 
would have, and have now arguably acquiesced in the east feifice as a boundary. Melodee 
Imus Aff. at Tj 23 (R. 231); Jim Imus Aff. at ^ 23. (R. 252.15 Accordingly, if the west 
boundary is now moved 5 feet to the east as the Bahrs request, the Imuses' will have lost 
approximately 5 feet of their property which they may not now recover. Such an 
inequitable result should not be permitted. 
Although the conduct of the Bahrs' predecessors in interest is enough, on its own, 
to justify estoppel in this case, the Bahrs' own conduct also militates against moving the 
boundary line. The Bahrs openly admit that when they purchased their property, they did 
so with full knowledge of the Boundary Fence and did not "suspect or believe" they were 
purchasing the disputed parcel. Robert Bahr Dep. at 32:23-33: 8. (R. 732.) Rather, they 
believed they were purchasing only the property to the west of the Boundary Fence, and 
did not believe the legal description contained in the deed to the Bahr Property was at 
13
 Statement of Facts, supra, at lH 5, 7. 
14
 Statement of Undisputed Facts, supra, at % 8. 
15
 If the Plaintiffs' are correct in their assertions regarding th^ true location of the 
boundary line between their property and that of the Defendants, the Defendants' eastern 
boundary fence is also improperly located by a distance corresponding to the size of the 
Disputed Parcel. However, due to the long passage of time arid the circumstances 
surrounding the construction of the eastern boundary fence, the Imuses have likely lost 
the ability to recover this property. Such a result is plainly inequitable. 
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variance with the Boundary Fence. Id. at 74:9-22. (R. 743.) The Bahrs even admit that if 
title to the Disputed Parcel is quieted in them, they would be getting more than they 
thought they were getting at the time they purchased the Bahr Property. Robert Bahr Dep. 
at 33:9-13. (R. 752.) 
Further, although the Bahrs now claim that they "questioned' during their 
ownership of the property whether the fence marked the true boundary (a claim the 
Imuses vigorously deny but treated as true only for the limited purposes of their summary 
judgment motion), they admit that prior to the initiation of this litigation in March of 
2004, they never took any action to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or 
occupying the disputed parcel.16 The Bahrs have also expressly admitted that prior to the 
dispute over the Russian Olive Tree in approximately September of 2003, they took no 
action (such as obtaining a survey or even measuring their property) to determine whether 
I 7 
the Boundary Fence actually marked the property line. 
Given the undisputed actions of the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, the Wymans, 
as well as the undisputed conduct of the Bahrs, it would be inequitable to now move the 
boundary as the Bahrs request. Moving the boundary at this stage would not only require 
16
 Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65:7-12 (R. 760); Robert Bahr Dep. at 26:10-21. (R. 731.) 
17
 Complaint at 1| 28 (R. 4); Sherri Bahr Dep. at 45:16-46:1. (R. 755-756.) On summary 
judgment, the Bahrs contended that they did "take action" to prevent the Imuses from 
using, occupying, or improving the Disputed Parcel, in that they complained to Sandy 
City and obtained a survey. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 3-4. (R. 650-651.) However, these alleged actions did not occur 
until approximately a year prior to the initiation of this action in March of 2004, or nearly 
15 years after the Bahrs acquired their property. 
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the Imuses to incur significant expense, but would also cause them significant 
inconvenience, as irrigation systems would have to be relocated, their storage shed would 
have to be removed altogether, and they would lose virtually kll of the irreplaceable 
mature landscaping on the west side of their property.18 Rerhoval of the west side 
landscaping would eliminate the Imuses' privacy and shade, ^nd destroy the fruits of the 
Imuses' many years of hard work and long hours devoted to beautifying and improving 
their landscape. Melodee Imus Aff. at f 22 (R. 231); Jim Imijs Aff. at U 22. (R. 252.) 
Such loss would be virtually impossible to mitigate at any reasonable cost, as the mature 
growth on the west side of the Imuses property has taken over 20 years to plant, grow, 
and develop through constant tending. Id. Finally, the Imuse$ would also lose 
approximately 5 feet of their property, which they likely coulcfl not recovery from their 
east neighbor after the long passage of time. 
These undisputed facts demonstrate that the equities iri| this case plainly weigh 
heavily in favor of leaving the Boundary Fence in place, and tjhat the Imuses have met all 
of the elements of boundary by estoppel. Given this, the trial court certainly did not abuse 
its discretion in holding that the Bahrs should be estopped frofn now claiming title to the 
Disputed Parcel, and its ruling should be affirmed. 
B. The Bahrs' New Arguments On Appeal Are Without Merit 
On appeal, the Bahrs contend that the trial court improperly granted the Imuses 
summary judgment because there are additional "elements" to a Boundary by Estoppel 
claim that the Imuses have not satisfied or which present disputed issues of fact. 
18
 Melodee Imus Aff. at If 21 (R. 231); Jim Imus Aff. at ^ 21. ^R. 252.) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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However, as discussed more fully below, the Bahrs' new arguments either misstate or 
misapprehend the law, and should be rejected. 
1. The Representations of the Bahrs and Wymans are 
Sufficient to Support Estoppel. 
The Bahrs assert that estoppel is improperly applied in this case because there has 
been no "fraud or misrepresentation of fact" by either the Bahrs or the Wymans. However, 
even a cursory examination of Utah case laws reveals that no such showing is required to 
support a claim for Boundary by Estoppel. 
The court's decision in Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, ^  14, 
101 P.3d 830, is directly on point. In Dahl, the defendant poured a cement driveway 
along a line the defendant believed marked the boundary between the defendant and the 
plaintiffs property. Plaintiff thereafter brought an action to quiet title to the property, 
asserting that the driveway actually encroached on property to which he was legally 
entitled. Id. The defendant invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The court held that 
the elements of equitable estoppel were as follows: 1) action or a failure to act that is 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; 2) reasonable action taken on the basis of the 
action or failure to act; and 3) a showing that injury would result from allowing 
repudiation of such action or failure to act. Id. Despite the fact that there was no "fraud 
or misrepresentation" on the part of the plaintiff, the court held the plaintiff was 
"estopped from asserting a claim to the property" because plaintiff had "failed to notify 
[defendant] of its claim"' before the driveway had been poured and that "requiring 
[defendant] to abandon or remove the driveway would constitute an injury." Id. at fl5. 
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Likewise, in Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997) the plaintiff, after 
initially representing to the defendant that she did not want ar^ d would not accept child 
support, later sought to recover reimbursement equivalent to five years of back child 
support payments from the defendant. Id. at 678. The defendant raised equitable 
estoppel, explaining that based upon the plaintiffs representations that she did not want 
child support, he had married and started a family, and was accordingly not financially 
capable of paying the back child support payments in additior| to the current child support 
payments. Id. at 681. Applying the same three elements of equitable estoppel as the court 
in Dahl, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the trial couilt had correctly held that the 
defendant had "reasonably changed his position in reliance or\ [the plaintiffs] 
representations'' that she did not want him to pay child suppoift, and that the plaintiff 
should be estopped from now taking a position "inconsistent ^vith" her earlier 
representations. Id. 
The foregoing authority makes it plain that no affirmative "fraud or 
misrepresentation" is required to apply estoppel. Rather, as in Dahl, inaction on its own 
can form the basis of estoppel. Similarly, as in Irizarry, a party who makes 
representations of future intent upon which another party reasonably relies can be 
estopped from later changing her mind and contradicting thos$ representations when there 
has been detrimental reliance. 
In this case, not only did the Wymans fail to stop the Infuses from constructing the 
Boundary Fence, locating their eastern boundary fence, and in$talling improvements 
along the fence, the Wymans affirmatively represented prior to the construction of the 
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fence and improvements that they would agree to treat the Boundary Fence as the actual 
boundary line. These facts are not disputed by the Bahrs, nor can they be. The Wymans 
have even testified that they believe that based upon their representations to the Imuses 
regarding the Boundary Fence, it would be inequitable to now quiet title to the Disputed 
Parcel in the Bahrs, or require removal of the Boundary Fence.19 
Further, to the extent that the action of the Bahrs is relevant, their conduct also 
supports application of estoppel. While the Bahrs have testified that they suspected or 
believed that the Boundary Fence did not mark the true boundary, apart from allegedly 
expressing this suspicion to the Imuses, they never took any action to determine whether 
that was the case, or to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or occupying the 
property east of the Boundary Fence.20 Given these undisputed facts, the Imuses have 
plainly satisfied the elements of boundary by estoppel. 
2. The Parties Had Sufficient Knowledge to Support Estoppel 
The Bahrs next contend that equitable estoppel is improper because the Bahrs "did 
not have actual knowledge of the true boundary line," and therefore did not act "with 
19
 Brenda Wyman Aff. at f 8 (R. 218); Brent Wyman Aff. at ^ 8. (R. 223.) 
20
 Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65:7-12 (R. 760); Robert Bahr Dep. at 26:10-21. (R. 731.) 
21
 The cases cited by the Bahrs in support of their arguments do not alter this analysis. 
For example, Youngbloodv. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, fflf 14,15, 158 P.3d 1088, 
recognized the same elements of equitable estoppel identified by the court in DahU and 
involved a very specific application of these elements as well as the elements of 
promissory estoppel in the narrow context of modification of the written terms of an 
insurance policy. Id. Likewise, in Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 
(Utah 1976) the court noted that while "the measure we apply to plaintiffs claims of 
estoppel is an adaptation to this case of the standard heretofore approved by this court," 
the standard adopted by the court and cited by the Bahrs is not materially different from 
that set forth in Dahl and numerous other Utah cases. 
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actual knowledge of the relevant facts" in failing to object to ^he Imuses' use and 
improvement of the Disputed Parcel. This argument suffers f|om multiple flaws. 
First, the Bahrs fail to recognize the undisputed knowledge and affirmative action 
of the Wymans that lies at the heart of the Imuses equitable e$toppel claim. There is no 
dispute that the Wymans were aware that they did not know t|ie precise location of the 
actual boundary, and that they were well aware that the agreed line may not conform 
precisely with the actual boundary. However, despite the parties' uncertainty regarding 
the precise location of the true boundary line, the Wymans represented that they would 
treat the line now marked by the Boundary Fence as the true boundary line if the Imuses 
constructed the Boundary Fence. 
It is undisputed that the Wymans knew that based upoii this representation, the 
Imuses would expend funds and labor to build the Boundary Fence. They also knew that 
the Imuses agreed with their neighbor to the east to build an eastern boundary fence in a 
location that was based upon the Wymans' representations regarding the western 
i 
Boundary Fence, giving up property that likely cannot now be recovered. After the 
Boundary Fence was constructed, the Wymans also were awaite that based upon their 
representations, the Imuses expended funds and many, many ijours improving the 
Disputed Parcel. 
The trial court held that these representations and subsequent reliance by the 
Imuses justified the application of equitable estoppel. This ruling is consistent with the 
undisputed facts and the legal standard for equitable estoppel get forth in DahL Irizarry, 
and numerous other Utah cases. The Bahrs have not produced any evidence that this 
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determination amounts to an abuse of discretion, and the trial court's ruling should 
accordingly be affirmed. 
Second, to the extent that the action of the Bahrs is relevant, they certainly acted 
with sufficient knowledge to justify the application of estoppel against them. At the time 
the Bahrs purchased their property they were aware of the existence and location of the 
Boundary Fence, that the Imuses occupied and claimed the property up to the Boundary 
Fence, that the Imuses maintained the property up to the Boundary Fence, that the Imuses 
planted vegetation and trees up to the Boundary Fence, and that the Imuses had installed 
irrigation systems up to the Boundary Fence.22 The Bahrs have further testified that while 
they suspected or believed that the Boundaiy Fence did not mark the true boundary, apart 
from allegedly expressing this suspicion to the Imuses, they never took any action to 
determine whether that was the case, or to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or 
occupying the property east of the Boundary Fence. 
In short, although the undisputed conduct of the Wymans is alone enough to justify 
the application of estoppel in this case, the undisputed conduct and knowledge of the 
Bahrs only further supports the trial court's determination that equitable estoppel is 
proper. 
22
 Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65:7-12, 87:2-11; 114:12-115:11 (R. 760,766, 773); Robert Bahr 
Dep. at 26:10-21; 50:24-51:12. (R. 731, 737.) 
23
 Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65:7-12 (R. 760); Robert Bahr Dep. at 26:10-21 (R.73 I). On 
summary judgment, the Bahrs contended that they did w'take action" to prevent the Imuses 
from using , occupying, or improving the Disputed Parcel, in that they complained to 
Sandy City and obtained a survey. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 3-4. (R. 650-651.) However, these alleged actions did not 
occur until approximately a year prior to the initiation of this action in March of 2004, or 
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3. The Affirmative Representations of tfye Wymans Support 
Estoppel 
According to the Bahrs, estoppel cannot be applied in this case because the Bahrs 
never made any affirmative representations to the Imuses, buj; instead were, at worst, 
merely "silent," and "mere silence or inaction" is not a ground for estoppel "unless there 
is a duty to speak or act." The Bahrs further contend that in ^ny event, they were not 
"silent," in that they allege they expressed to the Imuses their suspicion that the Boundary 
Fence did not mark the true boundary. 
As a threshold matter, the Bahrs argument fails because it ignores that it is 
primarily the undisputed actions of the Wymans, not the Bahr^, the forms the basis of the 
Imuses estoppel claim. As discussed at length supra, the Bahjrs predecessors in interest, 
the Wymans, were not merely silent, but affirmatively represented to the Imuses that they 
would agree to treat the fence as the boundary if the Imuses would build the fence. These 
actions are binding on the Bahrs as the Wymans successors in|interest, and on their own 
support the application of estoppel in this case. 
Further, Utah courts have expressly held that "silence"1 or "inaction" can form the 
basis of a claim for boundary by estoppel. As discussed supra\, in Dahl the court held that 
where the plaintiff failed to object to the defendants' pouring d>f a driveway that the 
plaintiff believed encroached on his property, he was thereafte^ estopped from asserting 
his claim. Dahl, 2004 UT App. 391 at f^ 15. As the Dahl court plainly stated, estoppel is 
nearly 15 years after the Bahrs acquired their property. 
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appropriate where there is "action or failure to act" upon which another party reasonably 
relies to his detriment. Id. 
As also discussed at length supra, the Bahrs' inaction supports estoppel. The 
Bahrs have testified that while they suspected or believed that the Boundary Fence did not 
mark the true boundary, apart from allegedly expressing this suspicion to the Imuses, for 
nearly fifteen years they did not assert any claim to the Disputed Parcel, nor did they take 
any action to determine whether the Boundary Fence was mis-located, or take any action 
to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or occupying the property east of the 
Boundary Fence. Under Dahl and other Utah authority, such inaction can plainly support 
an equitable estoppel claim. 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that 
the Imuses' reliance on the Wymans representations regarding the boundary fence 
justifies estoppel. 
4. The Imuses Reasonably Relied on the Wymans5 Representations 
The Bahrs next contend that the trial court erred in applying equitable estoppel 
because 1) the Imuses were not "hapless victims who were deluded by the malfeasance of 
another party" into building the boundary fence; and 2) the Imuses improperly relied on 
the representations of the Wymans that they would treat the Boundary Fence as the 
boundary line. Neither of these contentions is entitled to serious consideration. 
As discussed supra, Utah law is clear that in order to support a claim for estoppel, 
a party need not demonstrate that there has been a "fraud or misrepresentation of fact," 
but rather only that a party's "action or failure to act" which induces detrimental reliance 
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is ^inconsistent with a claim later asserted." As the court ma<fie clear in Dahl and Irizarry, 
where a party fails to act or makes representations that induc^ detrimental reliance, 
estoppel is proper. Given this, the Bahrs' assertion that something akin to fraud is 
required to support a claim for estoppel is simply contrary to Utah law. 
Further, although their argument is somewhat confusiijg, the Bahrs apparently 
contend that the Imuses could not have reasonably relied upoi^  representations of the 
Wymans regarding the Boundary Fence because the Imuses cpuld have resolved any 
uncertainty regarding the actual location of the boundary line by obtaining a survey. This 
argument demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of thp Imuses' equitable estoppel 
claim. 
The Imuses do not contend that the Wymans represented that they knew the true 
location of the boundary line, and that the Imuses relied on th}s representation in building 
the Boundary Fence and using the Disputed Parcel. Rather, tb|e representation by the 
Wymans upon which the Imuses relied was the representation [that despite the parties' 
uncertainty regarding the precise location of the true boundary line, the Wymans would 
treat the line now marked by the Boundary Fence as the true boundary line if the Imuses 
constructed the Boundary Fence, 
Based upon this representation, the Imuses expended fijnds and labor to build the 
Boundary Fence, located their eastern boundary, spent thousands of dollars and many, 
many hours improving the Disputed Parcel, and also placed sh^ds in the Disputed Parcel 
which would now have to be destroyed if the Boundary Fence lis moved as the Bahrs 
Request. 
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Based on these facts, the case cited by the Bahrs in support of their argument, 
Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1985), is inapposite. In Barnard the court 
refused to enforce an oral land sales contract between a mother and son because the legal 
description of the land to be conveyed was uCtoo indefinite to permit specific 
enforcement/' Id. at 1115. The court further rejected the son's claim that his mother 
should be estopped from claiming a deficiency in the description, finding that "[t]here is 
nothing in the record even implying that [defendant] knew the contract was unenforceable 
because of a deficiency in the description of the land" and that she therefore could not 
have made any misrepresentation regarding the propriety of the description upon which 
the son relied. Id. at 1115-1116. In addition, since the son received a refund of his 
money, he was not damaged and did not demonstrate any detrimental reliance. Id. at 
1116. 
This case is distinctly different from Barnard. Whereas in Barnard the defendant 
did not make any affirmative representation upon which the plaintiff relied, in this case 
the Wymans represented that they would treat the Boundary Fence as the true boundary 
line. Unlike Barnard, where the plaintiff claimed he relied upon the defendant's implied 
assertions regarding the legal sufficiency of the terms of the oral contract, the Imuses do 
not contend that the Wymans made any representation regarding the location of the true 
boundary line. Rather, the representation the Imuses relied on was the representation that 
if the Imuses built the fence in the agreed location, the Wymans would treat it as the true 
boundary line. Finally, whereas in Barnard the plaintiff did not demonstrate any damages 
or detrimental reliance, the Imuses expended the costs for the fence, installed their 
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landscaping, irrigation, and sheds and located their eastern boundary fence based upon the 
Wymans representation that they would treat the western Boundary Fence as the true 
boundary line. 
In short, the trial court was well within the law in holdfng that the Imuses 
reasonably relied upon the representations of the Wymans in building the Boundary 
Fence, improving and using the Disputed Parcel, and locating their eastern boundary 
fence. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion) and its ruling should be 
affirmed. 
5. Moving the Boundary Would Cause Significant Injury 
The Bahrs contend that the trial court improperly applied equitable estoppel in this 
case because equitable estoppel requires a showing that "permanent improvements" were 
made, and the Imuses did not make such "permanent improvements" in the Disputed 
Parcel. This argument misstates both the facts and the law. 
Equitable estoppel in Utah requires only that "injury" result if the estopped party 
repudiates its act or failure to act. See Dahl Inv. Co. v. HugheL 2004 UT App 391, ^ 14, 
101 P.3d 83. To the extent the Imuses' injury in this case is manifested through the 
making of improvements, the improvements they installed on tjhe disputed parcel are 
permanent and substantial. Based upon the actions of the Wynjians and the Bahrs, the 
Imuses installed a fence, landscaping, irrigation systems, and storage sheds. These 
improvements are certainly as permanent and substantial as the) driveway at issue in DahU 
and removing them would cause injury to the Imuses. See Ho^an v. Swayze, 237 P. 1097, 
1101 (Utah 1925) ("It must be conceded that any permanent improvements, such as 
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buildings [and] fences . . . will enhance . . . the value of adjacent land."). See also 
Adamson Cos. v. City o/Malibu, 854 F.Supp. 1476, 1481 (CD. Cal. 1994) (referring to 
landscaping as a "permanent" improvement); In re Greenland Homes, Inc., 227 B.R. 710, 
716 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1998) (referring to landscaping as a "permanent improvement"); 
Grant v. Hipsher, 64 Cal.Rptr. 892, 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (referring to a fence as a 
"permanent" improvement); Williams v Rogier, 611 N.E.2d 189, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1993) (referring to a border fence as a "permanent" improvement), overruled on other 
grounds', Babin v. Babin, 433 So.2d 225, 226 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (referring to a fence as 
a "permanent" improvement); In re Babb, 567 P.2d 599, 584 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) 
(indicating that a fence is a "substantial" improvement); Ex parte Askins, 356 S.E.2d 838, 
838 (S.C. 1987) (indicating that a fence is part of a "permanent" improvement).24 
Further, even if the improvements installed by the Imuses were not "permanent," 
as the Bahrs attempt to define that term, estoppel would still be proper because making 
improvements is only one way in which detrimental reliance and injury can be 
established. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has held that, "it is a rule almost of 
universal application that one who stands by and sees another purchase land or enter upon 
24
 These cases demonstrate that many different courts, in many different contexts, view 
the types of improvements made by appellees as permanent and substantial. The cases 
cited by appellants, on the other hand, focus on improvements that are easily moved (a 
small ditch in Downing v. Boehringer, 349 P.2d 306 (Idaho 1960); bricks set in sand in 
Marhenholz v. Alff, 112 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1962); and a mobile home in Gorbics v. 
Close, 722 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)) or on improvements that were not 
even on the disputed property (as in Evans v. Forte, 510 So.2d 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1987)) or for which no evidence of cost or effort existed (as in Dart v. Thompson, 154 
N.W.2d 82 (Iowa 1967)). 
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it under a claim of right and permits such other to make expenditures or improvements 
under circumstances which would call for notice or protest cannot afterward assert his 
own title against such person." Migliaccio v. Davis, 232 P.2q 195, 200 (Utah 1951) 
(emphasis added). Under this authority, the expenditures oftiie Imuses on the Boundary 
Fence and the irrigation system and landscaping in the Disputed Parcel are sufficient to 
support estoppel. 
Moreover, other "injury" sustained by the Imuses, including the loss of property, 
shading, and privacy, also supports equitable estoppel. Indeed, while the Bahrs cite 
Peterson v. Johnson, 34 P.2d 697 (Utah 1934), to attempt to narrow the type of 
cognizable injury, Utah case law (including Dahl) indicates otherwise. Although 
Peterson does use the phrase "permanent improvements" in dicta, it does so based on the 
earlier case of Tripp v. Bagley, 276 P. 912, 918 (Utah 1929), Which discusses 
improvements in the context of whether or not the party claiming estoppel would incur 
any injury. Accordingly, the test is not whether the Imuses affixed a specific type of 
"permanent" improvement on the disputed parcel - it is whether or not the Imuses would 
be injured if they had to move their fence and improvements. "See id. at 918. 
The undisputed evidence shows that the Imuses would be so injured. Based upon 
the representations of the Wymans, the Imuses located their eastern boundary fence 
approximately five feet farther to the west than they otherwise [would have and have now 
arguably acquiesced in the eastern fence as a boundary. Accordingly, if the western 
boundary is now moved five feet to the east as the Bahrs request, the Imuses will lose 
approximately five feet of their property that they may not everj recover. In addition, the 
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Imuses installed their west side landscaping in the Disputed Parcel based upon the 
location of the Boundary Fence, and would now lose all of this irreplaceable, mature, 
twenty-year-old landscaping if the boundary is moved as the Bahrs request. As such, the 
Imuses would be severely injured if the boundary is now moved, and equitable estoppel is 
proper in this case. 
C. The Trial Court Properly Relied on the Court's Decision in Dahl 
Essentially repeating arguments they have already made elsewhere in their brief, 
the Bahrs assert that the trial court erred in relying on Dahl in applying equitable estoppel 
in this case for the following reasons: 1) the court's ruling in Dahl was reached following 
a trial and not on summary judgment; 2) unlike the estopped party in Dahl, the Imuses 
were not uncertain of the true boundary line; and 3) the Imuses did not rely on 
representations of the Bahrs in installing the Boundary Fence or improving the Disputed 
Parcel. None of these alleged "distinctions" are significant or undermine the trial court's 
ruling. 
1. The Trial Court's Ruling on Mixed Questions of Law and Fact is 
Entitled to Deference and Should Not be Reversed Absent an 
Abuse of Discretion 
The Bahrs contend that unlike Dahl, the trial court's resolution of the mixed 
question of law and fact presented by the Imuses equitable estoppel claim is not entitled 
to deference on appeal because the trial court did not rely on live testimony in 
determining the operative facts. However, as discussed at length supra, Utah courts have 
specifically held that such deference is proper regardless of whether the relevant facts 
considered by the trial court in resolving mixed questions of law and fact were stipulated 
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or presented through written motions, as opposed to live testimony at trial. See Standard 
of Review, supra, at 2-5. Given this, the abuse of discretion Standard set forth in Dahl 
applies in this case. 
2. The Imuses Were Uncertain of the Trtie Boundary 
The Bahrs contend that Dahl is inapposite because the jlmuses were not ^ignorant 
or uncertain of the true boundary line" prior to the time they Constructed the Boundary 
Fence and other improvements as were the defendants in Dah\L This argument ignores 
the extensive undisputed facts to the contrary, which indicate Ithat the Imuses and Bahrs 
were, in fact, uncertain of the true boundary.25 Given this, Ddfol is applicable. 
This argument further ignores that unlike the defendant] in Dahl, the Imuses did not 
simply build the fence and rely on the silence of the Wymans }n invoking estoppel. 
Rather, the Imuses shared their uncertainty with the Wymans, |who did not simply remain 
silent, but affirmatively represented that they would treat the ijence as the boundary if the 
Imuses would build it. Such reliance is even more compelling that that at issue in Dahl, 
and the reasoning of Dahl accordingly militates strongly in faVor of estoppel in this case. 
3, The Representations of the Wymans Justify Estoppel 
The Bahrs finally assert that the trial court improperly relied on Dahl because 
unlike the defendants in Dahl, the Bahrs did not own their property at the time the Imuses 
constructed the Boundary Fence and installed the improvements in the Disputed Parcel 
25
 See Melodee Imus Dep. at 55:11-19, 57:10-58:13, 60:8-12 (R. 683-684); Jim Imus 
Dep. at 34:13 - 36:10, 37:10-18 (R. 711-712); Brenda Wyman JAff. at If 5 (R. 218); Brent 
Wyman Aff. at |^ 5. (R. 223.) 
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and accordingly were not present to object to the fence. However, the actions of the 
Wymans and the inaction of the Bahrs is sufficient to support estoppel. 
As already discussed at length supra, it is undisputed that the Bahrs' predecessors 
in interest, the Wymans, affirmatively represented to the Imuses that if they built the 
Boundary Fence, the Wymans would treat it as the true boundary. It is further undisputed 
that in reliance on these representations, the Imuses constructed the Boundary Fence, 
located their eastern boundary, and installed improvements in the Disputed Parcel. 
Accordingly, this case presents an even more compelling case of reliance than in Dahl, 
where estoppel was supported by mere silence. 
Moreover, the Bahrs have testified that while they suspected or believed that the 
Boundary Fence did not mark the true boundary, apart from allegedly expressing this 
suspicion to the Imuses, for at least 15 years they did not take any action to determine 
whether that was the case (such as obtaining a survey or even measuring their property), 
or to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or occupying the property east of the 
Boundary Fence, Sherri Bahr Dep. at 65*7-12 (R. 760); Robert Bahr Dep. at 26:10-21 (R. 
731). Accordingly, to the extent the conduct of the Bahrs is relevant, their undisputed 
behavior supports estoppel under the reasoning of Dahl. 
D. The Bahrs' New Argument of "Counter Estoppel" Should be Rejected 
In what amounts to little more than recycling arguments already made elsewhere in 
their brief to fit a new theory not presented to the trial court in opposing the Imuses' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Bahrs contend that the Imuses should be ucounter-
estopped" from invoking equitable estoppel. In support of this new legal theory, the 
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Bahrs repeat their allegation that by relying on the representations of the Wymans in 
building the Boundary Fence, the Imuses are the victims of "their own error'' and it would 
be inequitable for the Imuses to "now blame the Bahrs" for this error because the Bahrs 
were not present when the Boundary Fence was built. 
As a threshold matter, this argument was not raised before the trial court and is 
instead made for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, it should be rejected without 
further consideration on this ground alone. 
Moreover, the Bahrs' argument fails on the merits. As discussed at length, supra, 
the Bahrs cannot ignore the conduct of their predecessors in interest. While the Imuses 
were admittedly uncertain of the precise location of the true bpundary line, it is 
undisputed that the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, the Wymahs, were well aware of this 
uncertainty and represented to the Imuses that if they would construct the Boundary 
Fence, the Wymans would treat it as the true boundary. It is farther undisputed that the 
by the time the Bahrs obtained their property, significant detrimental reliance by the 
Imuses had already occurred, in that they had already built the| Boundary Fence, located 
their east boundary, laid out their yard, and installed extensive improvements in the 
Disputed Parcel. This undisputed action by the Bahrs' predecessors in interest is binding 
on the Bahrs and is, on its own, enough to justify the applicati6n of estoppel in this case 
under Dahl and other Utah authority. 
In addition, it is undisputed that despite their alleged su$picions regarding the 
accuracy of the Boundary Fence, for at least fifteen years after [acquiring the property, the 
Bahrs did not themselves take any action (such as obtaining a qurvey or even measuring 
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their property) to determine whether the Boundary Fence was accurate, or to prevent the 
Imuses from using, improving, or occupying the property east of the Boundary Fence. 
Given this, there is no basis for "counter estoppel," and the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in applying equitable estoppel in this case. 
Finally, the Bahrs imply that they are somehow entitled to an estoppel because the 
Imuses allegedly erroneously represented to them that the Boundary Fence marked the 
proper boundary, and the Bahrs relied on this representation in not disputing the property 
line. This argument is inherently flawed. The doctrine of equitable estoppel operates to 
prevent a party from contradicting representations upon which another party relies to its 
detriment. In this case, even if the Bahrs" assertions that the Imuses previously 
represented to them that the Boundary Fence was the proper boundary are accepted as 
true, the Imuses are not now attempting to contradict this alleged representation by 
asserting that the Boundary Fence is not the proper boundary. Accordingly, there is no 
basis for "estopping" the Imuses from continuing to claim that the Boundary Fence 
should be treated as the boundary. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an essential element of "counter 
estoppel" is reasonable reliance on the estopped party's alleged action or inaction. Arnold 
Industries, Inc. v. Love, 2002 UT 133, f 20, 63 P.3d 721 ("counter estoppel" claim failed 
because parties did not establish "reasonable reliance"). The Bahrs have repeatedly 
alleged that they did not believe the Imuses' alleged representations that the Boundary 
Fence marked the true boundary line. Robert Bahr Dep. 62:20-64:2 (R. 740); Sherri Bahr 
Dep. 23:14-22. (R. 750.) Indeed Robert Bahr specifically testified that he did not rely in 
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any way on the Imuses5 alleged representations regarding thej property line and the 
Boundary Fence. Id. Given this, another critical element of c|ounter estoppel is not met 
and the Bahrs' counter estoppel claim must fail. 
E. The Bahrs Are Bound by the Conduct of Th0ir Predecessors in Interest 
The Bahrs claim that the Imuses' equitable estoppel cl^im cannot be sustained 
because the actions of their predecessors in interest, the Wym|ans, are not binding upon 
them. This argument fails because (1) it is contrary to Utah l^w; (2) it is contrary to the 
law in numerous other jurisdictions; and (3) the Bahrs' own conduct supports estoppel. 
In Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990), the jJtah Supreme Court stated 
that the boundary by estoppel theory "requires the combinatioji of acts or representation 
by the original landowner and reliance by a neighbor on those|representations." Id., 423 
n.4 (emphasis added). The adjective "original" necessarily iirjplies that there is a 
subsequent landowner that is bound by the original - by its predecessor in interest. 
Indeed, the word would have no meaning otherwise. As such, |there is no need to examine 
the foreign and secondary sources cited by the Bahrs - the Ut^h Supreme Court has 
already indicated that Utah subscribes to the rule that grantees are bound by an estoppel 
that would have bound a grantor (the "Predecessor Rule"). Set Carter v. University of 
Utah Med. Ctr., 2006 UT 78, f 9, 150 P.3d 467 (stating in the similar context of statutory 
construction that courts should avoid interpretations that will render words superfluous or 
inoperative). 
This authority is consistent with other Utah authority relating to the analogous 
doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and boundary by agreement. In both cases, Utah 
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courts have repeatedly held that the actions of a landowner's predecessors in interest are 
binding upon successors, even where they had no knowledge of them. See RHN Corp. v. 
Viebell 2004 UT 60, f30, 96 P.3d 935; Brown v. Milliner, 232 P.2d 202, 206 (Utah 
1951). It would make little sense for the Predecessor Rule to apply to these doctrines, but 
not to the very similar and related doctrine of boundary by estoppel. Indeed, if the 
position urged by the Bahrs were accepted, a party that would be otherwise estopped from 
inflicting injury on an innocent party could circumvent estoppel merely by transferring its 
deed to another party. 
Such a result is not only irrational, it would be particularly inequitable here, where 
the Wymans made express representations to the Imuses, inducing their reliance, and the 
Bahrs had clear and obvious notice of the situation before they purchased their property 
from the Wymans. While the Bahrs call themselves "bona fide purchasers," Utah law is 
clear that purchasers may only invoke bona fide purchaser status if they purchased the 
subject property without notice of another party's claim and that "[s]uch notice may be 
actual or constructive." Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App. 278, ^ 24, 989 P.2d 61. It is 
also clear that "constructive notice may arise from a duty to inquire when one has 'the 
knowledge of certain facts and circumstances.'" Id. (quoting First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. 
IB. Ranch, 966 P.2d 834, 837-38 (Utah 1998)). 
The Wymans have admitted that notwithstanding their alleged belief that the 
Boundary Fence was inaccurate, when they purchased their property, they did so with full 
knowledge of the Boundary Fence. The Bahrs were further aware that the Imuses made 
claim to the property on their side of the Boundary Fence, and that the Imuses occupied, 
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maintained, irrigated, and improved the property on their sid^ of the Boundary Fence. 
Moreover, even the Bahrs own citations recognize thai other jurisdictions "hold 
that a person who derives title from or through another party b ordinarily bound by every 
estoppel that would have bound the other party." 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 
133.26 These authorities specifically follow the same Predecessor Rule as Utah. See, e.g., 
Holden v. Weidenfeller, 929 S.W.2d 124, 131 (Tex. App. 1996) ("An easement by 
estoppel, once created, is binding upon successors in title if reliance upon the existence of 
the easement continues."); Greenan v. Solomon, 472 S.E.2d 54, 57 (Va. 1996) ("[Tjhose 
who derive title from or through the parties [] ordinarily standi in the same position as the 
parties, and are bound by every estoppel that would have beeri binding on the parties.") 
(quotiations omitted). See also 31 CJ.S. Estoppel and Waived § 65 (2008) ("The privies 
i 
of a grantor or grantee are estopped to the same extent as the Original parties to the deed, 
and may in like manner take advantage of the estoppel."). 
Further, even in jurisdictions that do not follow the Predecessor Rule, the courts 
will still apply estoppel if the subsequent purchaser had notice of the estoppel. See Evans 
26
 The other secondary authority cited by the Bahrs is 31 CJ.S. Estoppel and Waiver, § 8 
(1996), which has now been replaced by a later version of the Corpus Juris Secundum 
that does not support the proposition cited by the Bahrs. See 31 CJ.S. Estoppel and 
Waiver, § 8. Further, even the language cited by the Bahrs specifically endorses estoppel 
"as between the same parties or those in legal privity with theijn." Here, the Bahrs 
purchased their property from the Wymans, receiving title by <Aeed. This constitutes 
privity. See, e.g., Myers v. Key Bank, N.A., 495 N.Y.S.2d 755 
1985) ("[Petitioners, as grantees in privity with an estopped g\ 
since they were not bona fide purchasers without knowledge 
39 S.E.2d 384, 387 ("The defendants . . . having . . . purchased the land of [grantors] 
stand in privity of title to them and would likewise be estopped . . . ."). 
757 (N.Y. App. Div. 
tantor, are also estopped 
I . ."); Long v. Trantham, 
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v Wittorff, 869 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no estoppel only if the 
grantee had no notice). See also 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 133 (discussing a 
ubona fide purchaser without notice of an estoppel against his or her grantor"). Here, the 
Bahrs had notice that the Imuses claimed the Disputed Parcel, as discussed supra. 
Finally, the Bahrs' own conduct itself justifies application of boundary by 
estoppel. Although the Bahrs now claim that they u questioned" whether the fence 
marked the true boundary during their ownership of the property (a claim the Imuses 
vigorously deny but treated as true for the limited purposes of summary judgment below), 
they admitted that for nearly 15 years after acquiring their property, they never took any 
action to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, and occupying the disputed parcel. 
Additionally, the Bahrs admit that, prior to the dispute over the Russian Olive Tree in 
approximately September 2003, they took no action to determine whether the fence 
actually marked the property line. This conduct constitutes a failure to act that is 
inconsistent with the Bahrs' current claims, which failure to act reasonably caused the 
Imuses to install significant improvements on the disputed parcel. Allowing the Bahrs to 
repudiate their actions at this point would cause the Imuses significant injury, and the 
Bahrs should be estopped from doing so. 
Based on the foregoing, the Bahrs are properly estopped by their own conduct and 
by that of their predecessors in interest. 
II. THE IMUSES ARE ENTITLED TO THE PROPERTY ON THEIR SIDE OF 
THE BOUNDARY FENCE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY 
AGREEMENT 
While the trial court's ruling can and should be sustained based solely on the 
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doctrine of boundary by estoppel, it can also be affirmed based upon the doctrine of 
Boundary by Agreement. As the Utah Supreme Court has hdld, "it has long been 
recognized" in Utah that "when the location of the true boundary line between two 
adjoining tracts of land is unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof may, by 
parol agreement, establish the boundary line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and 
their grantees." Hummel v. Young, 265 P.2d 410, 411 (Utah 1953). The undisputed facts 
demonstrate that the Imuses and the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, the Wymans, 
established just such a "boundary by agreement," which is bidding upon the Bahrs. 
The Imuses purchased their residential property at 2084 E. Buckingham Drive in 
Sandy, Utah in March of 1983. Shortly thereafter, in about Jijine of that year, the Imuses 
approached the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, the Wymans, and asked whether they 
were interested in constructing a fence marking the boundary between the two 
properties.27 The Wymcins indicated that although they could hot afford to help pay for the 
Boundary Fence, they would like to have the fence and woulc| be willing to assist in the 
location and construction of the fence.28 During this same period, the Imuses consulted 
with their then-neighbor to the east, Mr. Dalton, who also agreed to aid in the 
construction of a boundary fence on the east side of the Imuses' property.29 
The Imuses thereafter purchased the materials to construct the fence. Because the 
parties were uncertain of the precise location of the true boundary line, they mutually 
agreed to a location for the boundary line and constructed the boundary Fence along that 
27
 Statement of Facts, supra, at f^ 2. 
28
 Statement of Facts, supra, at •fl 3. 
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line. Based upon the Wymans' representation that they agreed to this location of the 
boundary line, the Imuses used the materials they had purchased and, with the Wymans' 
help, constructed the Boundary Fence. Id. 
The agreed boundary line is binding on the Bahrs, as successors in interest to the 
Bahrs. Hummel, 265 P.2d at 411. Based upon these undisputed facts, the Imuses have 
satisfied the elements of their Boundary by Agreement claim, and are entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
In opposing the Imuses' Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue, the Bahrs 
asserted that application of Boundary by Agreement was improper in this case because, 
inter alia, the Imuses and Wymans were not ^uncertain" of the true boundary line and 
there was no "long period of acquiescence" in the established boundary line thereafter. 
As set forth at length in the Imuses' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment and 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Bahrs' arguments 
are without merit and do not preclude summary judgment in favor of the Imuses based 
upon the doctrine of Boundary By Agreement. Rather than fully repeat these arguments 
here, the Imuses refer the Court to these memoranda.31 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Imuses respectfully request that the Bahrs' appeal be 
29
 Statement of Facts, supra, at ]f 2. 
30
 Statement of Facts, supra, at f^l 4-5. 
31
 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 457-
486.); Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
801-908) 
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denied. 
DATED this>*tn day of August, 2008 
ft J. Dale 
Christian D. Austin 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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